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This paper reviews the EC’s Bolivian Country Strategy Paper and assesses it in the 
light of previous evaluations of the EC’s aid programme in the country and the EU’s 
overall development objectives. As this paper draws heavily upon the Bolivian Poverty 
Reduction Strategy it begins with a review of this document and recent critical 
assessments of its implementation. 
 
Introduction 
This paper intends to examine the case of Bolivia as a means of evaluating the 
European Commission’s (EC) Country Strategy Paper (CSP) formulation process. 
Bolivia provides a particularly interesting case study as it has consistently pursued the 
IMF/World Bank macro stabilisation formula and has subsequently been a pioneer in 
the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy and of a Comprehensive 
Development Framework. As we will see the EC’s CSP (C(2002)1875) draws heavily 
upon Bolivia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (BPRS) and therefore this paper will 
begin with a review of its major features and of the weaknesses that have been 
identified. But it will also attempt to assess whether the CSP has responded to a 
previous critical evaluation of the EC’s Bolivian aid programme and whether it fulfils 
the commitments of the European Union’s (EU) broader development policy. It is with 
a brief outline of recent EU development policy changes that the paper begins. 
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European Commission Development Policy Objectives 
The EU's development policy objectives were detailed in 2000 (EC 2000b) and identify 
poverty reduction as the EU's priority. However there remains some ambiguity (see 
Dearden 2002), with the document recognising that poverty reduction is a 
multi-dimensional problem requiring access "to adequate food supplies, education and 
health, natural resources and drinking water, land, employment and credit facilities, 
information and political involvement, services and infrastructure." Nonetheless the EC 
seeks to exploit its ‘comparative advantage’ in aid delivery and has therefore decided to 
focus upon seven broad areas of activity - trade and development, regional integration, 
transport, rural development, health and education, institutional capacity building and 
macro economic budget support. The latter reflects a general desire to shift support 
away from project aid towards broader sectoral and macro support; recognising the 
fungibility of aid. In its development policy the EC also places an emphasis upon 
‘coherence’, ‘coordination’ and ‘complementarity’. Development policy should be 
coherent in regard to the EU's other policies, in particular in its approach to 
international and bi-lateral trade negotiations. Aid policy should also be coordinated 
and complementary to the aid programmes of other donors, including the national 
programmes of the member states. 
   Central to the implementation of the EC's development policy are the preparation of 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP). These are intended to review the social, economic and 
political situation of each recipient country and to assess the performance of previous 
EC aid programmes. These documents then provide the framework for detailed aid 
programmes; project, sectoral and structural. They are a product of discussions with the 
recipient government, to ensure "ownership", and other donors, including the Bretton 
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Woods institutions and EU member states. Within the Commission the Interservice 
Quality Support Group (iQSG), composed of representatives of all Directorate Generals 
involved in the Community's relations with developing countries, has responsibility for 
ensuring that CSPs demonstrate consistency, minimum standards and fulfil the 
objectives determined by the group of External Relations Commissioners, which in turn 
reflects the overall development objectives of the Community. 
 Thus the national CSP's are expected to demonstrate a central poverty focus, within 
the context of a complementarity with both other donors programmes and the recipients 
national medium term development strategy, of which the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
will be the major component. At the same time they should include a response to 
previous evaluation results and provide clear indicators to provide a future assessment 
of programme performance. 
 
EU Latin American Relations 
 
Although the EU is Latin America’s second most important trading partner and second 
largest investor, it was with Spanish accession to the EU in 1986 that the importance of 
EU relations with Latin America gained prominence. Since 1986 this has been reflected 
in an 18% increase in aid to the region and a doubling of trade between 1990 and 2000. 
EU investment in Latin American also increased significantly from $13.3 bn. (1996) to 
$42.3 bn. (1999). 
  The EU’s relations with Latin America have regional, sub-regional and bi-lateral 
dimensions. The main regional dialogue is with the Rio Group, which was established 
in 1986 and now includes all Latin American countries. This concerns itself both with 
economic and broader political relations. The sub-regional grouping focuses upon 
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Mercosur and the Andean Community, of which Bolivia is a member. The Andean 
Community, which was created in 1969 with the Cartagena Agreeement (CAN), also 
includes Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuelan. EU-CAN relations were governed 
by the 1993 EU-Andean Community Framework Co-operation Agreement, which has 
recently been revised. This Agreement is aimed at promoting trade, investment, finance 
and technology transfer with the EU, whilst recognising the Andean countries’ 
development status.  Through this agreement to the EU also intends to support Andean 
sub-regional integration. The political dialogue has concentrated upon regional 
integration, democracy and human rights and, particularly, anti-drugs issues. The latter 
has been supported by €110 m. of funding by the EU. 
 As a member of the Andean Community Bolivia benefits from the General System 
of Preferences, which grants duty-free access to the EU for exports of industrial goods 
and a number of agricultural products. This results in 90% of CAN exports entering the 
EU market duty-free. The current scheme will be revised after 2004.  
 
Bolivia 
Bolivia has the lowest per capita income in Latin America at $2,355 (1999) with 61% 
of the population living below the national poverty line; in comparison with a Latin 
American average of 36%. The incidence of poverty is greatest amongst the indigenous 
population, women and in the rural areas, although in absolute numbers it is greatest in 
the urban areas (52%) as a result of urbanisation. It is the prime cause of food 
insecurity. Traditionally an economy dominated by the mining industries (tin, silver and 
zinc) it has recently diversified into oil and gas. It possesses the second largest reserves 
of natural gas after Venezuela. However the urban economy is characterised by a 
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‘dualism’ between the modern service sector and an informal low-wage 
trading/domestic service sector. Agricultural production is dominated by subsistence 
farming, constrained by water shortages, poor road infrastructure and problems with 
land ownership rights. 
 Bolivia has been undertaking the ‘Washington consensus’ structural reform 
programme since the mid-80s; liberalising markets and opening up the economy. 
Domestic prices were decontrolled and the labour market deregulated. A low uniform 
import tariff was adopted and the currency devalued with adoption of a crawling-peg. 
The free movement of capital was established, an Investment Law for foreign 
investment adopted and interest rates decontroled. The Central Bank was given 
independence in its regulation of monetary and exchange rate policy. Fiscal reform 
reduced public expenditure and increased the tax base, narrowing the government 
budget deficit, whilst monetary policy was tightened. A programme of privatisation has 
been pursued and resources reallocated to local municipalities. By 1999 the 
municipalities were responsible for 21% of public investment. In 1997 it became 
eligible for the HIPC Initiative (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) providing debt relief 
which will be worth $2.3 billion over 40 years to Bolivia, while other aid flows are 
expected to total $1.87 billion over the years 2000-06. 
 Although it has achieved a growth rate averaging 4% over the last decade its 
performance has deteriorated significantly over the last three years as a result of adverse 
climatic factors and the general deterioration in the world economic environment. 
Public finances remain problematic, with a budget deficit of 2.3% of GDP and an 
accumulated short-term debt of $1.4 billion. Government support for the failed national 
pension scheme remains a particular burden. By 2000 formal-sector unemployment had 
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reached 180,000, with another 470,000 working less than 20 hours per week; but it is 
estimated that 69% of employment is in the informal sector. 
 Even before the current recession there had been little success in reducing poverty - 
between 1976 and 1992 the proportion of the population below ‘basic needs’ only fell 
from 85% to 70%. Bolivia's income distribution also remains one of the most unequal 
in Latin America - the Gini coefficient had risen from 46.2 in 1990 to 58.9 in 1997. 
Overall Bolivia's progress in meeting the International Development targets has been 
very mixed. While primary school enrolment rates have increased the drop-out rate has 
not improved (30%) and the quality of education remains poor as a result of low 
teachers' salaries. In health, Bolivia continues to have the highest mortality and 
morbidity rates in Latin America, and 26% of children show delayed growth from 
malnutrition. Similarly in housing 40% of dwellings were found to be unsatisfactory 
(1992), with only 1% of rural households have access to domestic sanitation. 
Nonetheless life expectancy has increased to 62.1 years (1999) from 60.6 in 1995. 
 
Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Although the ‘human development’ dimension of economic progress was recognised 
from the mid-90s in government policy "the conceptual advances were not matched by 
actions ensuring effective results in poverty reduction"(p.25 BPRS). Institutional 
weaknesses, inadequate control mechanisms and the need to establish a new 
relationship with international donors were all apparent. By 1999 Bolivia was 
successfully achieving 100% of its HIPC 1 targets across health, education and rural 
development. 
 The Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS)(2001) was the product of a 
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substantial consultative exercise (the ‘National Dialogue’) and has four main strategic 
objectives - to enhance employment and income opportunities, enhance social security, 
increase the productive capabilities of the poor and promote ‘social integration’. 
Employment/income policies will focus upon the productive capacity of small 
agricultural producers through broadening access to land, the promotion of 
diversification and development of micro enterprises and the provision of micro 
finance. Investment will be concentrated upon rural infrastructure, including 
electrification, road construction and irrigation. Priority will also be given to primary 
education, basic health provision and sanitation. There will also be emergency 
employment programmes to reduce the economic vulnerability of particular social 
groups – i.e. the elderly and children. Finally promoting social integration will be 
achieved through a programme of administrative decentralisation and ‘popular 
participation’, including support for civil organisations. Echoing EC development 
objectives there are also the ‘cross-cutting’ issues - policies to promote opportunities 
for ethnic groups and womens' rights and environmental management - and recognition 
of the need for institutional reform which "combats corruption and guarantees 
competitiveness, reduces uncertainty and provides equal opportunities"(p.59). 
 The EC has given increasing emphasis in its development policy to the issues of the 
rule-of-law, human rights and good governance. At the same time the EC recognises the 
importance that needs to be placed upon the ‘ownership’ of any development policy by 
the developing country, an ownership that will ensure political commitment and which 
requires popular participation if it is to genuinely reflect social priorities. To achieve 
these objectives funding is being directed to ‘capacity building’ - support for 
institutional reform through technical assistance and training. 
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  The BPRS was itself a product of comprehensive public participation (National 
Dialogue 2000) and this confirmed the importance of institutional reform. 
Modernisation of public administration began in 1990 but the reforms "lacked 
continuity and implementation was very precarious" (BPRS p.139). Corruption is 
specifically identified as a continuing and serious problem (BPRS p.157). In 1997 
Bolivia had the second worst incidence of perceived corruption (Transparency 
International). In response the government has adopted a National Integrity Plan, 
implemented since 1999 - emphasising judicial reform, structural changes such as the 
independence of National Customs and transparency in the systems of public 
administration. Decentralisation to the municipalities, begun in 1994, has also raised 
the issue of political corruption and managerial competence at these more local levels. 
Some of the larger municipalities have been subject to state intervention as a result of 
financial mismanagement. 
 In terms of public administrative reform new Civil Service Regulations, and an 
Integrated Management and Administrative Modernisation System (SIGMA) have all 
been adopted. However a System for Monitoring and Evaluating Performance-based 
Government Management (SISER) did not survive beyond 2002 when both donors and 
management decided to withdraw funding. The BPRS recognises that the successful 
implementation of these initiatives requires an ongoing commitment from the various 
government divisions. ‘Rule-of-law’ issues have also been addressed with a succession 
of measures to ensure the independence of the judiciary, updating the Civil and 
Criminal Codes and management reforms. 
 Finally the BPRS specifically outlines the role of "civil society" in the social control 
of public administrations, through the creation of Vigilance Committees and Local 
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Consultative Committees for local monitoring, local control through School Boards, 
Local Health Directorates and producer associations and other civil associations. From 
these organisations will be drawn representatives supervising national public agencies. 
The EU has emphasised the role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 
development strategies and their participation is explicitly reflected in these 
organisational arrangements. However, the EC focus upon NGOs is also intended to 
provide an alternative mechanism for aid delivery in the context of ‘failed states’.  
 Of the foreign aid available for investment the BPRS allocates 48% of it to the 
employment/income objective and an additional 34% to ‘capacity’ enhancement. By 
contrast ‘safety and protection of the poor’ is allocated 4% and ‘cross-cutting’ 
objectives 5%. However too much should not be read into these figures as the 
employment and capacity objectives themselves contain a commitment to a poverty 
focus. 
 The programme of decentralisation to the municipalities is an important component 
of the administrative reforms and HIPC II funds will allocated directly to these 
municipalities, 70% according to poverty criteria (unsatisfied basic needs). To ensure 
the efficiency of the investment the BPRS proposes moving to a result-orientated 
management system, with an emphasis upon effective evaluation. Priorities should 
move from historic allocations to greater flexibility in allocation, reflecting 
performance and the BPRS priorities. At the same time the BPRS recognises the 
importance of sustainability in investment, estimating that the projected investment of 
$4.3 bn. over the period 2001-2006 will require $1.7 bn. in recurrent expenditure. 
However such recurrent expenditure is currently met by severely constrained domestic 
funding. The lack of domestic counterpart funds has been a recurring cause of the slow 
 10
disbursement of aid. Although the private funding and maintenance of some public 
infrastructure is proposed, particularly in regard to highways, a funding gap nonetheless 
remains. The BPRS therefore calls for greater flexibility in regard to the provision of 
foreign aid to accommodate both the change to results-orientated project funding and to 
ensure the sustainability of public investment, with changes in counter-part funding 
requirements and the financing of recurrent expenditure. These approaches are certainly 
consistent with the EC's shift of emphasise to budget support and its own focus upon 
results-orientated aid management. 
 The BPRS will be implemented within the context of a continuing commitment to 
‘macro economic balance’ achieved through the established polices of structural 
reform. Although it is recognised that economic progress could be compromised by 
external shocks such as climatic change (El Nino), or a further deterioration in the 
terms of trade, these policies are expected to deliver a growth rate of 5% to 5.5% per 
annum over the succeeding 15 years. During this period the percentage of families 
falling below the poverty line is expected to fall from 62.4% to 40.6%.  
 To monitor progress a number of performance indicators have been proposed falling 
into three major groups – intermediate, impact and outcome. In the short term 
‘intermediate’ indicators are to be adopted to monitor programmes and projects. These 
fall into four categories, reflecting the BPRS's four broad objectives - employment 
opportunities and income, capacities, security and participation - together with the 
cross-cutting themes. Employment/income includes rural development programmes 
(measured by indicators such as the rate of growth of non-industrial production and the 
area under irrigation), road infrastructure (percentage of primary road network paved) 
and microfinance (percentage of municipalities with access to financial services). 
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Productive capacities includes education programmes (indicators including spending on 
schools, number of educational centres) and health (percentage of children with low 
birth weight, percentage of households with piped water and access to basic sanitation). 
The security objective focuses upon land ownership and is assessed by the area for 
which land titles have been established. Participation involves qualitative assessment 
through the proposed three-yearly ‘National Dialogues’. The cross cutting objectives 
will be monitored through indicators such as the number of ethnic micro enterprises 
(ethnicity) and the percentage of women with access to literacy programmes and basic 
health insurance (gender). The environmental objective focuses upon the completion of 
plans for water resources and flood control, with a quantitative measurement of the 
increase in income as a result of wildlife management programmes. 
 Longer-term evaluation is undertaken through the employment of ‘outcome’ and 
‘impact’ indicators. The ‘impact’ indicators offer a longer term view of improvements 
in various economic and social determinants of the level of poverty, while the 
‘outcome’ measures provide a medium term assessment. Outcome indicators include 
per capita family income, infant mortality rates, school attendance and student 
performance in languages and maths. The impact assessment is to be based upon the 
rate of growth of per capita income, the index of poverty at national, urban and rural 
levels, and the proportion of the population with more than eight years schooling. 
Formal programme evaluation will focus upon the BPRS priority areas of transport, 
education, health insurance and childcare.  
 Thus the BPRS establishes a comprehensive structure of short and long-term 
quantitative indicators underpinning the continuous process of monitoring and 
evaluation. 
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International Cooperation 
To achieve the effective implementation of the BPRS it called for international donors 
to play their part by introducing flexibility into the disbursement rules, simplifying and 
harmonising their administrative requirements and adapting their aid programmes to the 
priorities defined in the BPRS. One criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the EC's 
approach to its assistance programme to Bolivia will be to ask how far this offers a 
response to this request. 
 The Bolivian government has established a ‘New Framework of Relationships’ with 
the donors to ensure that assistance is coordinated and channelled to meet BPRS 
priorities. Joint financing with the government is a central feature of these 
arrangements, together with a preference for more direct budgetary support to enhance 
flexibility in resource allocation. There is specific encouragement that donors should 
"simplify and harmonise procedures for contracting, financing management and control, 
assuming national (ie. Bolivian) regulation of these procedures where possible" (para 
850). Similarly it called for the evaluation mechanisms of the BPRS to be central to the 
monitoring and evaluation procedures of the donors. The government also sought the 
‘untying’ of aid wherever possible. Finally the Framework encourages the international 
donors to delegate greater authority to their local agencies to encourage flexibility and 
streamline programme implementation. Implementation of the new Framework is 
expected to make a major contribution to increasing the rate of disbursement of funds 
and improving the ability of public agencies to absorb aid. 
 
BPRS Assessment 
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The BPRS has been regarded as the core expression of Bolivia’s Comprehensive 
Development Framework, itself a ‘test bed’ for the new approach being taken by the 
international donor community. As a result it has been subject to considerable scrutiny, 
with a recent comprehensive evaluation by the World Bank (2003). A number of 
weaknesses were identified in this report - the dangers of fragmentation through 
devolved ‘over-municipalisation’, unrealistic growth assumptions, failure to prioritise 
amongst existing programmes, partly as a result of donor advocacy of their own 
projects, and its failure to address the more intractable and politically sensitive 
development issues (e.g. inclusion of indigenous people, land redistribution, tax, 
corruption). A lack of political support for the BPRS and the reform agenda is seen as a 
central problem, with the BPRS being superimposed upon the existing political process. 
Indeed Bolivia has a long history of formulating comprehensive development plans, of 
which the BPRS is but the latest example. The question has been raised as to whether 
the BPRS is merely as response to the demands of the international donors, a 
prerequisite to qualify for access to HIPC II funds, rather than the expression of a 
national development strategy to which there is political commitment. In particular the 
environmental and gender agenda was regarded as one that was very much imposed by 
the international donors. 
 However the report also identifies a number of significant weaknesses in the role of 
the international donor community. Problems exist with the committed distribution of 
funding to support the BPRS  – excess funding for institutional capacity and cross-
cutting programmes and under-funding for productive capacity, employment and 
income programmes. Problems also continue with the failure to coordinate aid; there 
are still 850 separate existing projects. An element of competition between aid agencies 
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still exists in some cases, and even where there is joint-funding difficulties can arise 
from differing procurement requirements. Further these ‘cooperation islands’ can 
undermine national policy – e.g. “roads and municipal institutional capacity-building, in 
which centrally managed approaches or sectoral programmes – pushed by sector units 
in the headquarters of multilateral agencies – continue to impose themselves.” (p.44). 
The EU was specifically identified for its failure to coordinate its aid programmes 
across the EC and the Member States.  
 A recent appraisal of Bolivia’s progress in adopting results-orientated public 
management (Montes 2003) has confirmed many of these weaknesses. Again he 
identified the central problem as a lack of political commitment to reform, with a public 
administration compromised by clientalism and patronage resulting from the unstable 
coalition politics of Bolivia. He concluded that the reform programmes have had little 
impact upon the performance of the civil service, with a lack of credibility in personnel 
management, budgeting and financial controls. He found Bolivian public administration 
to be characterised by “pervasive political interference, high staff turnover, non-
compliance with formal procedures and systematic corruption” (p.4). The weaknesses 
of the budgeting process were such that it was difficult to incorporate the strategic 
recommendation of the BPRS or to carry out evaluations, as the monitoring 
mechanisms were too weak, especially at the municipal level (IMF-IDA 2001). The 
Audit Office produced quality reports but with no subsequent action. The Institutional 
Reform Project had “left budget processes untouched, introduced poor organisational 
and personnel reforms and a weak national evaluation system.” (p.23) This project had 
ignored the recommendations of the World Bank (2000) review that had called for the 
de-politicisation of personnel management, the strengthening of central oversight 
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capacity, the enhancement of ‘citizen voice’ (i.e. civil society) to exercise control and 
learning from the experience of giving autonomy to the regulatory agencies. 
 In terms of the role of the international donors Montes confirmed the difficulties of 
ensuring a coherent and coordinated approach, despite Bolivia being a ‘pilot’ for a 
Comprehensive Development Framework. Few sector-wide programmes had emerged 
as donors continued to work through projects; this approach was even adopted for the 
Institutional Reform Project. The project approach had contributed to a “fragmentation 
of government Ministries, the creation of ‘donor-specific’ parallel structures and 
distorting pay scales…The strategies of these projects have not been comprehensive 
and have focused on activities not outcomes… with little feedback from civil society.” 
(p.27). In part this approach can be explained by the reluctance to provide more general 
budget support in view of Bolivia’s poor capacity for financial management. 
Nonetheless he suggested that the adoption of strictly conditional budgetary support 
might force the pace of budgetary reform. 
 Although donors have made a significant contribution to supporting the dialogue 
between the government and civil society and the de-politicisation of some areas of 
public administration (e.g. Customs, Ombudsman, Civil Service Superintendency), they 
have been reluctant to address the core political problem and often lack the local 
‘political knowledge’ to be sufficiently proactive. Montes concluded that donors were 
more effective when strengthening the voice of civil society than when replacing it and 
should focus their evaluations less upon formal rule changes than actual compliance 
and outcomes. But he concluded that “at this point it is doubtful that many of the 
proposed BPRS policies will be implemented given the absence of a strong government 
champion, the poor institutional environment and the high level of corruption.” (p.18). 
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European Aid 
Technical and financial assistance is currently provided under Council Regulation 
(EEC) 443/92, which covers both Latin America and Asia.  This regulation emphasises 
targeting at both the poorest countries of the regions, and the poorest sections of their 
communities. In particular it argues for focusing upon those areas where “domestic, 
economic and human resources are difficult to mobilise, but which are of strategic 
importance for the development of the countries concerned or for the international 
community as a whole”. 
 EC development assistance to Bolivia began in the 1970s with support for a number 
of uncoordinated NGO initiatives, but from 1982 this was supplemented by a series of 
major projects, under technical and financial cooperation instruments (TFC), and food 
aid. Between 1970 and 1994 EC aid totalled €300 m., of which 60% was provide under 
TFC, 29% as food aid and 9% as co-financing with NGOs. The main programmes were 
focused upon integrated rural development in the Altiplano (60%) and flood protection 
in the Pirai river valley and Lake Titicaca basin (15%).  
 In 1992 the EC sought to revise its aid programme in Bolivia seeking to diversify 
the instruments employed and to extend its activities into new areas of activity. This 
process presented considerable difficulties and, as we will see, is not necessarily 
completed. The first ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed in 1994, with 
assistance focusing upon poverty reduction, administrative and institutional reform, 
private sector development and regional integration. Direct food aid ended in 1995 to 
be replaced by ‘food security’ projects administered at the municipal level or as a 
sectoral programme (PASA) by the Ministry of Agriculture offering institutional 
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support, investment and micro finance. Recently the EC has also been focusing upon 
water and sanitation, education and health and in providing support for the Alternative 
Development Strategy for the coca growing region of Chapare and the outward 
migration areas of the Altiplano.  
 The EC, in its own right, accounted for 5.4% of Bolivia’s grant aid between 1990 
and 2001 (c.f. 28% from USAID) and has been averaging €40-50 m. per annum in 
recent years. The EC has also contributed $14 m. to HIPC specifically for Bolivia. 
 
EC Aid Evaluation 
In 1995 a highly critical evaluation of EC aid to Bolivia had been published (Canessa & 
Kaeppler). Many of the criticisms reflected more general problems with the EC’s 
administration of the Community’s development policy (see for example Montes et al 
1998) and which subsequently lead to administrative reform (European Commission 
2000a). The initial projects were very much a learning experience for the EC in a 
difficult economic and political environment. Hyperinflation, poor procedures and weak 
management structures lead to loss of control. All of this activity took place within the 
context of a lack of a coherent country strategy. Projects that were initially emergency 
measures were simply replicated as a successful formula, encouraged by similar 
requests from the Bolivian government. 
 Thus the rural development projects, intended to provide drought relief in the 
Altiplano, ultimately absorbed €100m over 15 years; 20% of all EC funds for rural 
development in Latin America. No attempt was made to assess whether “the means 
brought to bear were excessive in relation to outcomes”. Serious questions were raised 
in the report as to the feasibility of significantly improving agricultural productivity in 
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this area given its extremities of climate. Similarly, although the food aid programme, 
which was worth €89 m. from 1983-92, provided significant humanitarian relief, it was 
doubtful whether it made any serious contribution to addressing the underlying 
problems of insufficient purchasing power.  
 In total 2,000 km of roads and 5,000 ha. of land were irrigated, but with only 
limited local impact, and  serious problems arose from the failure to consider the 
sustainability of these projects. Failure to maintain roads and flood defences 
undermined the value of many of the EC financed infrastructure projects.  
 Problems also arose with the second major component of the rural development 
initiative, the provisions of micro credit in a revolving fund. In practice the problems of 
absorptive capacity were considerable. As a result less than half the funds were 
disbursed and two-thirds of loans became bad debts. 
 Turning to the less significant drug control budget line, here the report again noted 
“ambitious objectives and the lack of a clear strategy”. There was a failure to address 
the political and social context of coca production, with the Bolivian government’s 
efforts at coca eradication regarded as a political gesture to appease the US. The 
projects undertaken could equally well have been funded under the rural development 
and infrastructure budget heads.  
 Finally the report considered the co-financing of the NGOs. Although over 500 
projects had been supported none had any formal system of evaluation. However as 
these projects were low cost and closer to the beneficiaries the authors felt that there 
was a higher probability that they had achieved their objectives. 
 Overall the report identified a number of significant weaknesses. Projects were 
often found to be based upon unrealistic assumptions, with no risk assessment. All 
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projects failed to devote sufficient attention to their long-term viability, with the PAC 
rural development schemes neglecting product marketing and economic sustainability. 
There was little focus upon efficiency in the employment of resources, with excessive 
expenditure upon redundant capital equipment and expatriate technical assistants in 
many infrastructure projects. These infrastructure projects dominated the EC’s aid 
programme as this offered the easiest and most familiar strategy to maximise aid 
disbursement, without any clear country development strategy.  
 None of the projects had “adequate and systematic procedures for assessing the 
impact .. nor even reliable base data”. The available data focused solely upon inputs and 
physical outputs e.g. miles of road.  Monitoring by the EC had been improvised and 
Brussels supervision “scarcely a functional arrangement”. The “sharing of tasks 
between Brussels and the Delegation was far from clearly defined and coordination 
between the units in Brussels inadequate.”  
 During much of the period examined there was no permanent EC representation in 
Bolivia with the result that the EC had little influence in donor discussions. EC aid was 
also regarded as ‘soft’ in that it had few conditions. With the establishment of a 
Delegation and the changes in overall EC aid policy these conditions changed. Further 
from 1992 the EC sought to widen the scope of its assistance programme in Bolivia 
although traditional infrastructure project were still dominating in 1995, with other 
areas of activity (e.g. democratisation) still “isolated and insignificant”. 
 The reports made four broad recommendations, calling for a more careful choice of 
sectors and forms of intervention, clearer definition of the EC’s role vis-à-vis Bolivia’s 
own development policy, stricter management of resources and more effective 
monitoring and evaluation. It called for a clear poverty focus, an emphasis upon the role 
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of the private sector and the ‘harmonisation’ of activities (consistency) with the 
application of the most appropriate instruments. Overall it identified the need to avoid 
over ambitious projects and to ensure that all activity took place in a coherent 
development framework. It is to provide such a coherent framework that the EC has 
placed such emphasise upon the creation of Country Strategy papers. 
 
Country Strategy Paper 
 
As would be expected the European Commission’ s Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 
Bolivia (C(2002)1875) draws heavily upon the BPRS and clearly seeks to ensure that 
the EC's programme of assistance contributes to the Bolivian government's strategy. 
The poverty reduction strategy reflects the professed primary focus of EC development 
policy, as does the emphasis upon the role of the private sector, institutional 
strengthening to achieve ‘good governance’ and the ‘rule-of-law’ and the participation 
of civil society to achieve ‘ownership’ of the development strategy. In particular the 
CSP welcomes the emphasise in the BPRS upon the decentralisation to local 
authorities, the allocation of funds to these local communities based upon poverty 
criteria and the "institutional channels of consultation with civil society"; all within the 
context of a continuing commitment to macro stability. Nonetheless the CSP notes the 
limited success of the Bolivian government in the past in addressing social inequality 
despite its commitments in this regard since the 1990s. At the core of this problem the 
CSP sees "institutional weaknesses", an issue addressed in the government's own 
BPRS. But it also expresses concern at the lack of trust between government and civil 
society, reflected in continuing social protest, and the weaknesses of civil society 
organisations themselves, as trade union power declines and migration erodes the 
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influence of traditional rural representative organisations. It also expresses some doubts 
as to the funding assumptions underpinning the BPRS - "funds to implement the 
strategy may not be as ample as originally predicted" - which will require a clear set of 
priorities delivering tangible results. 
 The CSP itself identifies four priority areas for government action. Two are shared 
with the BPRS - consolidating decentralisation and reform of central government 
institutions and procedures, including anti-corruption measures. However the other two 
priorities do not receive significant attention in the Bolivian government's own 
development strategy - combating the cultivation and trafficking of coca and the 
strengthening of the private sector's regulatory regime. 
 The CSP's review of Bolivia's performance is, as would be expected, more critical 
than that of the BPRS. The completed privatisation programme has failed to deliver the 
expansion in transport capacity that might have been expected and overall the privatised 
companies returns upon capital remain low, at 6%. This may underlie the emphasise in 
the CSP upon reform of the regulatory system, although this remains unclear. Overall 
the private sector is seen as weakly capitalised, risk averse, uncompetitive and 
supported by state purchases. Meanwhile the financial system suffers from recurrent 
crises, requiring state intervention. The budget deficit, 56% of which is financed 
externally, remains a major constraint on government activity. Thus health expenditure 
has fallen consistently, in real terms, over the last ten years. Although support for the 
pension scheme is now accounting for 12% of total government expenditure, it only 
covers 20% of the relevant age group. Overall the response to recurring economic crises 
has been ad hoc, the latest being the creation of 70,000 jobs in an emergency 
programme. 
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 While expansion of the gas exporting industry offers substantial economic potential, 
the CSP expresses concern that this may lead to one-product dualistic development - an 
economy dominated by a capital intensive exporting industry with few internal 
multiplier effects. A broader development policy based upon strengthening the internal 
market and expanding employment through increased domestic and foreign investment, 
is regard as essential. 
 In terms of the EC's ‘cross-cutting themes’, the CSP recognises the progress in 
improving womens' access to education and health care, but also observes that the 
"Vice Ministry of Gender does not act strategically." The environment receives greater 
attention as the CSP notes the strong links between environmental degradation and 
poverty. The problems of desertification in the mountainous rural areas coinciding with 
the greatest incidence of poverty. It applauds the incorporation of disaster management 
into local planning, funded by the transfer of funds from central government to local 
municipalities and recognises the role of Bolivia as a pilot country for a National 
Sustainable Development Strategy supported by international donors. Finally the CSP 
emphasises the importance of Bolivia in the context of regional integration - one of the 
recurring themes of EC development policy and regarded as one the Commission's 
particular areas of expertise. With its membership of both of Latin Americas trading 
blocks (Mercosur and the Andean Community) and its strategic geographical position, 
it is a crucial player in regional integration. In support of its regional agenda, expressed 
at the Rio Summit, the EU is particularly concerned to enhance Bolivia's 
inter-continental road infrastructure. 
 In terms of the EC's aid programme three broad priorities are identified - improving 
access to services and sustainable livelihoods, enhancing growth and regional 
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integration. Having reviewed the aid programmes of the EU's member states, those of 
other multilateral agencies and having discussed priorities with the Bolivian 
government, in the context of both the BPRS and the ‘New Framework of 
Relationships’, three principal areas of cooperation for the period 2000-2006 were 
chosen - water and sanitation projects (€40-45 m.); employment development in coca 
and depressed mining areas (€18-20 m.) and the Santa Cruz - Puerto Suarez highway 
(€50-55 m.). With other more minor projects supporting institutional reform and 
capacity building, promotion of human rights and gender equality etc, the total aid 
package totals €126 m. 
 Although the CSP seeks to follow EC policy in moving towards sectoral support, 
with implementation delegated to the local administration, it expresses reservations as 
to the Bolivian government's ability to ensure adequate management and financial 
control. However it intends to ensure that a partial or full move to sectoral support can 
be introduced, beginning with the water and sanitation programme, if institutional 
reforms prove successful. The food security programme is already administered through 
the Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Assessment of the CSP 
 The CSP identifies two strategic objectives for the EC's Bolivian policy - 
contributing to the regional objectives of the Rio Summit process and supporting the 
poverty reduction objectives of the BPRS. It is the commitment to the development of 
regional integration that justifies the EC 's largest individual aid project - support for the 
construction of the Santa Cruz - Puerto Suarez highway - which is regarded as a crucial 
international road link. It is perhaps notable that this substantial commitment is not 
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placed within the context of its poverty impact, other than the claim that it will benefit 
agricultural activity on the eastern region. There remains the possibility that this 
substantial project still reflects the bias towards the replication of previous 
infrastructure programmes identified in the 1995 Evaluation Report. 
  The EC's commitment to internal policy coherence, in particular the relationship 
between its trade and aid policies, is only poorly reflected in the CSP. It does not 
attempt to address the trade dimension of EU-Bolivian relations, other than support for 
"Bolivian economic agents... to take full advantage of the competitive margin granted 
by the GSP (General System of Preferences)". This despite the priority given in the 
BPRS's discussion of the importance of market access liberalisation, through free trade 
treaties, to provide long run sustainability of development polices (BPRS para. 834). 
Clearly the CSPs would have difficulty accommodating, at the individual country level, 
trade relations issues that are addressed in wider regional or international groupings eg. 
WTO, Andean/Mercsur. Nonetheless this leaves individual CSPs, principally authored 
by Delegations, in something of a policy vacuum and may in part reflect the 
organisational divisions present in the Brussels Commission, which is responsible for 
international trade negotiations. 
 By contrast considerable attention is paid to policy coordination and 
complementarity. As already observed the CSP includes a comprehensive review of the 
aid programmes of the EU member states and other multilateral donors and this informs 
its choice of the areas of activity. However the issue of ‘comparative advantage’, rather 
than complementarity, is not addressed and reflects the failure to discuss in any detail 
the past performance of the EC's Bolivian aid programme. The CSP claims that the 
1995 Country Evaluation (Canessa & Kappler) confirmed that “EC aid made a useful 
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contribution and normally fulfilled the objectives of the Financing Agreements." (CSP 
p.18); a perhaps generous interpretation of the report. However it does acknowledge 
that problems were identified with the complexity of the implementation procedures 
and, more significantly, that in some cases there were questions about the long-term 
sustainability of projects and programmes arising from "limited provisions for sector 
conditionality". Certainly the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, providing the 
guidelines for the implementation of Community cooperation in Bolivia, specifically 
requires the government to demonstrate the adequacy of complementary recurrent 
domestic funds, maintenance capacity and effective management systems, before the 
EC will commit support to programmes. These issues will become more crucial as the 
EC shifts towards broader and more flexible sector funding. Nonetheless, addressing 
the serious problems identified in the 1995 Evaluation Report in regard to project risk 
assessment, implementation and evaluation, is not given the emphasis one might 
expect. 
 The organisational problems of complementarity are specifically addressed in the 
CSP. The Bolivian government has established a donor coordination system, the 
‘Consultative Groups’, as part of its BPRS implementation and ‘New Framework’. This 
group meets annually; although the qualification, ‘in principle’ (CSP p.24), raises some 
interesting questions. Further working groups meet to consider progress at the sectoral 
level. Four groups and seventeen sub-groups are concerned with the BPRS; of which 
the Netherlands coordinates for BPRS implementation and Denmark for ‘institionality’ 
and anti-corruption. In response to the EC's commitment to improved ‘internal’ 
coordination the European Commission's local Delegation has also established a system 
of liaison with the embassies of the EU's Member States as outlined in Annex 8 (CSP). 
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This coordination is intended to compliment the existing coordinating bodies and focus 
upon those sectors where the EC and its Member States have significant programmes. 
To effectively influence the content of projects the Delegation sees it as essential that 
there are working level coordinating meetings in anticipation of the annual 
programming consultation exercise. But it is also intended to achieve the political 
objective of increasing the EU's influence at the policy level, through ensuring a 
collective view in discussions with the Bolivian government when this diverges from 
that of the World Bank/IMF. It may also address the problems that are arising from the 
diminishing capacity of some bilateral donors to cope with the increasing complexity of 
aid provision within the new more comprehensive approach to development assistance. 
  
 To address the EU's commitment to address the cross-cutting themes of human 
rights, gender and environment, together with issues of ‘good governance’ (i.e. 
corruption), the Delegation proposed the appointment of a ‘lead donor’ from amongst 
the Member States to advise on their application. By May 2002 only the UK had 
accepted responsibility for ‘leading’ on gender issues. The ‘cross-cutting themes’ 
appear to be presenting as many problems in their treatment for the Commission and its 
Delegations as they are presenting to the Bolivian government. "The BRPS still reflects 
the tension that exists between treating these subjects as cross-cutting issues and 
treating them as individual sectors." (BRPS para. 870). While in the CSP - "In practice 
project managers ... are not always aware of these issues or indeed how to include them 
in the design and implementation" (CSP p. 60). These difficulties are probably reflected 
in the rather cursory treatment of cross-cutting themes in the CSP. 
 The EC in its development policies, has placed increasing emphasise upon ‘needs’ 
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and ‘performance’ criteria in allocating aid as it moves towards increasing 
conditionality in its assistance programmes. Thus in the Cotonou Agreement which 
covers the African, Pacific and Caribbean grouping of developing countries, the needs 
criteria include per capita income, population size, economic and social indicators 
(Human Development Index), level of indebtedness and dependence on export 
earnings. Performance indicators include progress in the implementation of institutional 
reforms, use of resources, effectiveness of implementation of existing programmes, 
poverty alleviation, sustainable development and macro and sectoral economic 
performance. The comprehensive set of quantitative indicators forming an integral part 
of the BPRS evaluation structure could meet EC performance assessment requirements, 
although some critics have placed an equal emphasis upon qualitative assessments. 
Given the importance of reducing any additional administrative burden imposed by 
external donor requirements, recognised both by the EC itself as well as identified as a 
problem by the BPRS, an effective BPRS evaluation framework could provide the basis 
for any EC monitoring of Bolivian performance. Indeed given the approval of the BPRS 
by the World Bank and its preparation to meet World Bank requirements, here we have 
the basis for an international consensus as to a common assessment criteria. In the case 
of the Bolivian CSP full advantage is indeed taken of the indicators generated by the 
BPRS to assess the performance of the individual programmes that the EC has chosen 
to fund. 
 
Conclusion 
The Bolivian CSP comprehensively reflects the new approach to the implementation of 
the EU's development strategy. Through drawing heavily upon the World Bank 
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approved BPRS it ensures a strong poverty focus and clear policy coordination with 
other international donors. It offers a more critical appraisal of Bolivia's economic and 
social performance than that suggested in their own BPRS and outlines the mechanisms 
for the implementation of the EC's own programmes, including clear assessment 
indicators. Nonetheless a number of aspects are worthy of note. 
 Despite the emphasis upon complementarity with other donors and references to the 
BPRS the reasons for the choice of programmes still remains unclear. There is no 
reference to the ‘value-added’ that the EC is bringing to these particular programmes, 
reflecting the very cursory reference to previous evaluations of the performance of the 
Bolivian assistance programme. The choice of an ‘alternative development’ programme 
to be implemented in the illicit coca producing areas appears driven by the EU's 
concern with its own global anti-drugs policy, building on the EU-Andean ‘specialised 
drugs dialogue’ which was signed in 1995. This may be an interesting example of the 
reality of the interaction of development and wider external relations considerations. 
The subsuming of the EU's development policy to the wider external relations political 
agenda remains one of the most controversial debates currently taking place in this 
policy area. 
 Similarly the substantial commitment to the funding of the Santa Cruz - Puerto 
Suarez highway is justified as meeting the EU's particular commitment to regional 
integration. This despite questions being raised as to the effectiveness of many of the 
EC's ‘regional’ programmes and the supposed move away from specific project towards 
more fungible budget and sectoral support. 
 It has already been noted that the implementation of ‘cross-cutting’ themes, outside 
of the context of specific projects, is proving problematic, both for the Commission and 
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the Bolivian government. There is clearly a question as to whether this reflects an 
impractical approach to fulfilling fashionable political objectives, generated by the 
European Parliament, or whether it is an area that requires the development of a more 
sophisticated methodology for implementation.  
 Detailed improvements in EC aid delivery – project implementation and evaluation, 
procedure harmonisation, financial control – will be dependent upon the Commission’s 
‘deconcentration’ programme in transferring responsibility and resources to its country 
Delegations. To be successful this must enhance the Delegations analytical capacities so 
as to create a detailed knowledge of the political and social obstacles to Bolivia’s 
development and to formulate a consistent policy upon this basis. For throughout the 
CSP there are guarded references to the problems of social conflict - the loss of trust 
between government and civil organisations - and good governance. The 
comprehensive programme of institutional and political reform outlined in the BPRS is 
clearly central to the country's development strategy, and this is recognised in the CSP. 
As technical assistance and support for institutional and administrative reform is mainly 
to be undertaken under the aid programmes of the EU's Member States, it emphasises 
the central role that coordination will have to play if the EC's programme is to deliver 
its Bolivian aid objectives. Such coordination will also be essential if the EU 
collectively is to realise its full potential in influencing the direction of Bolivian 
government policy and to ensure an alternative voice in the Bolivian development 
debate to that of the IMF and World Bank. 
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